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Abstract
In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolu-
tionary dynamics of symmetric N -player matrix games with two pure strate-
gies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on
how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a con-
sequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a
polynomial of degree N − 1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the re-
sulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in
Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern
of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability
of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this
relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching
have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix
games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for
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public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation.
Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains
from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.
Keywords:
evolutionary game theory, replicator dynamics, polynomials in Bernstein
form, public goods games
1. Introduction1
Game theory has been widely applied to evolutionary biology (May-2
nard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982; Eshel, 1996; Hofbauer3
and Sigmund, 1998; Rousset, 2004; Vincent and Brown, 2005; Dercole and4
Rinaldi, 2008; Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2013). More specifically, the applica-5
tion of game-theoretic concepts has been instrumental in explaining the evo-6
lution of traits as diverse as the sex ratio (Hamilton, 1967; Frank, 1987),7
dispersal (Hamilton and May, 1977; Comins et al., 1980), reciprocity (Axel-8
rod and Hamilton, 1981), group foraging (Clark and Mangel, 1986), polic-9
ing (Frank, 1995), and anisogamy (Bulmer and Parker, 2002). Evolutionary10
models of these traits often assume “playing the field” type of interactions11
(Maynard Smith, 1982, p. 23), where the payoff to an individual depends on12
an average property of the population or the group with which it interacts.13
There are many situations, however, where the payoff to an individual14
depends critically on the strategy profile in the population (or its group) and15
where the actions of different individuals cannot be averaged; that is, mass16
action does not apply. Typical examples involve collective action problems in17
moderately sized groups, where the change in behavior by a single individual18
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can result in a large, discontinuous change in payoffs to others (e.g., Boyd19
and Richerson, 1988). Such collective action problems have been modeled as20
multi-player (or multi-person) matrix games (Broom et al., 1997; Kurokawa21
and Ihara, 2009; Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010). Except for the very special22
cases in which group size is taken to be equal to two (so that the well-23
developed theory of two-player matrix games can be applied, cf. Weibull,24
1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Cressman, 2003) or the payoff structure25
is linear (as in the standard model of the N -person prisoner’s dilemma), such26
games have proven difficult to analyze.27
The intrinsic complexity of multi-player matrix games is already evident
for the case of symmetric games with two pure strategies A and B on which
we focus in this paper. For these games, the average payoff difference in a
large and well-mixed population is given by the so-called gain function (Bach
et al., 2006)
g(x) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kdk.
Here, n is the number of co-players of a focal player (so that N = n + 1 is28
the group size), x is the population fraction of A-strategists, and dk is the29
gain a focal player would obtain if switching from strategy B to strategy A30
when k other group-members play A. The evolutionary solution of the game31
(such as the set of evolutionarily stable strategies, ESSs, or the set of stable32
rest points of the replicator dynamics) involves not only finding the roots of33
the gain function g(x) (a polynomial of degree n) but also, as discussed in34
Broom et al. (1997), determining the behavior of g(x) in the vicinity of such35
roots. While this is straightforward for two-player games (for which g(x) is36
linear in x) and a full classification for three-player games (for which g(x) is37
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quadratic in x) is available (Bukowski and Mie¸kisz, 2004), payoff structures38
in groups of size larger than five lead to polynomials of degree greater than39
four that cannot, in general, be solved analytically (Clark, 1984).40
In order to deal with such complexity, the vast majority of previous works41
on multi-player matrix games has considered particular functional forms for42
the specification of the payoffs and has resorted to lengthy algebra or numer-43
ical methods to study the models (Joshi, 1987; Boyd and Richerson, 1988;44
Dugatkin, 1990; Weesie and Franzen, 1998; Hauert et al., 2006; Zheng et al.,45
2007; Cuesta et al., 2008; Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti, 2009; Souza et al.,46
2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011; van Segbroeck et al., 2012). In this47
way, some non-linear public goods games, including multi-player extensions48
of well-known two-person matrix games such as the stag hunt (Skyrms, 2004)49
and the snowdrift game (Sugden, 1986), have been characterized on a case-50
by-case basis.51
In contrast to these efforts, Motro (1991) and Bach et al. (2006) have52
taken a more systematic approach to the study of non-linear public goods53
games. Both of these papers consider situations in which each contributor to54
a public good pays a constant cost, whereas the benefit from the public good,55
which is obtained by all players, is a function of the number of contributors.56
Motro (1991) proves that in this case the replicator dynamics has at most57
one interior rest point if the benefit is concave or convex in the number of58
contributors. He also provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the59
existence of such a rest point and characterizes the stability property of all60
rest points. In a similar spirit, Bach et al. (2006) find sufficient conditions on61
the shape of the benefits such that there exists a critical cost level with the62
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property that for costs below such a level the replicator dynamics has two63
interior rest points, whereas for higher costs there is no interior rest point.64
Gokhale and Traulsen (2010) have discussed the relationship between the65
sign pattern of the gains from switching and the number of interior rest points66
of the replicator dynamics. Specifically, these authors observe that the repli-67
cator dynamics has a single interior rest point if the sequence (d0, d1, . . . , dn),68
which we refer to as the gain sequence, has exactly one sign change. Gokhale69
and Traulsen (2010) also note that the direction of selection (as given by70
the sign of the gain function g(x)) cannot have more sign changes than the71
gain sequence. This implies that the number of sign changes of the gain72
sequence provides an upper bound on the number of interior rest points of73
the replicator dynamics. The latter observation is also made in Hauert et al.74
(2006) and Cuesta et al. (2007). When g(x) has no multiple roots, any upper75
bound on the number of interior rest points translates directly into an upper76
bound on the number of stable rest points because, as noted in Broom et al.77
(1997, p. 939), in this case the rest points alternate between being stable78
and unstable.79
In this paper, we show how sign-change conditions like the ones discussed80
by Gokhale and Traulsen (2010) can be refined by using the fact that the gain81
function g(x) is a particular kind of polynomial, known as a polynomial in82
Bernstein form (or Bernstein polynomial), with coefficients given by the gain83
sequence (d0, d1, . . . , dn). Our analysis rests on the variation-diminishing84
property of Bernstein polynomials and a property that we refer to as the85
preservation of initial and final signs. These properties provide a tight link86
between the sign pattern of the gain sequence and the sign pattern of the gain87
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function.1 In particular, if the gain sequence has at most two sign changes,88
a full characterization of the possible dynamic regimes is easily obtained.89
For most of the collective action problems that have been modeled as90
multi-player matrix games it is straightforward to determine the sign pat-91
tern of the gain sequence. Moreover, because the gain sequences of these92
games have at most two sign changes, our characterization results provide all93
the information necessary to recover the results on the number and stability94
of rest points obtained in previous studies. We demonstrate these claims for95
two classes of public goods games, namely threshold games (e.g., Dugatkin,96
1990; Weesie and Franzen, 1998; Zheng et al., 2007; Souza et al., 2009) and97
constant cost games (e.g., Motro, 1991; Bach et al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2006;98
Pacheco et al., 2009; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011), and two additional ex-99
amples taken from Hauert et al. (2006) and van Segbroeck et al. (2012), thus100
supporting the claim that the approach developed here unifies, simplifies,101
and extends much of the previous work on multi-player matrix games.102
2. Model103
Interactions occur in groups of size N = n+1, in which a focal individual104
plays a game against n co-players or opponents. Each individual can choose105
between one of two different pure strategies, A and B. The game is symmetric106
so that, from the focal’s point of view, any two co-players are exchangeable.107
1The fact that the gain function g(x) is a Bernstein polynomial has previously been
noted by Cuesta et al. (2007). These authors also suggest that the variation diminish-
ing property of these polynomials may make the analysis of many multi-player games
straightforward, but do not pursue this idea.
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Let ak denote the payoff to an individual choosing A when k opponents
choose A (and hence n − k co-players choose B); likewise, let bk denote the
payoff to an individual choosing B when k opponents choose A. Also let
dk ≡ ak − bk
denote the gain the focal player makes from choosing A over B, taking the108
choices of other players (k playing A and n − k playing B) as given. The109
parameters dk, which describe the gains from switching, are collected in the110
gain sequence d = (d0, d1, . . . , dn). We assume d = 0, thus excluding the111
uninteresting case in which payoffs are independent of the actions chosen.112
Evolution occurs in an infinitely large and well-mixed population with113
groups randomly formed by binomial sampling. Hence, if the frequency of114
A-strategists in the whole population is x, the average payoffs obtained by115
an A-strategist and a B-strategist are respectively given by116
πA(x) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kak
and117
πB(x) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kbk.
We assume that the rules of transmission of the strategies (whether genet-118
ically encoded or individually or socially learned) are such that the frequency119
x of A-strategists in the population can be described by the replicator dy-120
namics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)121
dx
dt
= x(1− x)g(x), (1)
where g(x) = πA(x)−πB(x) is the gain function (Bach et al., 2006) given by122
g(x) = Bn(x;d) ≡
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kdk. (2)
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As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, the gain function is a poly-123
nomial in Bernstein form (also known as a Bernstein polynomial, cf. Farouki124
(2012)). This is made explicit by the notation we introduce in (2), where the125
Bernstein operator Bn maps the vector of Bernstein coefficients d ∈ Rn+1126
into the polynomial
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kdk in the variable x ∈ [0, 1].127
The replicator dynamics (1) has two trivial rest points at x = 0 (where128
the whole population consists of B-strategists) and x = 1 (where the whole129
population consists of A-strategists). Interior rest points 0 < x∗ < 1 are given130
by the solutions of the equation g(x∗) = 0. Because g(x) is a polynomial of131
degree at most n (and we have assumed d = 0) the replicator dynamics can132
have at most n interior rest points, corresponding to n simple roots of g(x)133
in the open interval (0, 1). In the two-strategy case we analyze here, rest134
points of the replicator dynamics can be either (locally asymptotic) stable or135
unstable. Stability of a rest point x∗ requires that (x−x∗)(g(x)− g(x∗)) < 0136
holds for all x = x∗ in the vicinity of x∗. Since the stable rest points of137
the replicator dynamics correspond to ESSs for the multi-player game (Bach138
et al., 2006), our following results about stable rest points of the replicator139
dynamics carry over to ESSs without any changes.140
Remark 1. The gain function g(x) given in (2) can also be interpreted as
the selection gradient on a continuously varying mixed strategy x (denoting
here the probability that an individual plays action A), evolving according
to the traditional breeder’s equation or the canonical equation of adaptive
dynamics (Dieckmann and Law, 1996), so that the dynamics is of the form
dx
dt
= v(x)g(x),
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for some measure v(x) of genetic variance (Kirkpatrick and Rousset, 2005).141
Hence, all our subsequent results pertaining to polymorphic equilibria in142
pure strategies can also be interpreted in terms of monomorphic equilibria143
for mixed strategies.144
3. Sign patterns and (the stability of) rest points145
The fact that the gain function is a polynomial in Bernstein form implies146
a tight link between the sign pattern of the gain sequence on the one hand147
and the sign pattern and number of roots of the gain function on the other148
hand. This is due to two properties of Bernstein polynomials, namely the149
preservation of initial and final signs and the variation diminishing property150
(see Properties 1 and 2 below). Because roots of the gain function correspond151
to interior rest points of the replicator dynamics and the sign pattern of152
the gain function informs us about changes in the direction of selection at153
interior rest points (as well as the direction of selection at the trivial rest154
points), general results about the number and stability of rest points follow155
immediately (see Results 1 and 2). These results hold for any non-zero gain156
sequence, allow for interior rest points at which the direction of selection157
does not change, and provide more detailed information about the number158
of rest points and stable equilibria than the observations made by Cuesta159
et al. (2007) and Gokhale and Traulsen (2010). Results 3 to 5 summarize160
the implications of the general results for gain sequences with at most two161
sign changes, providing the basis for our subsequent analysis.162
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3.1. Preliminaries163
To proceed, we require some terminology and notation to describe sign164
patterns (see Brown et al., 1981) and other relevant shape properties of gain165
sequences and gain functions. The same notation and terminology applies to166
other sequences and functions we encounter in our analysis.167
Let I(d) denote the sign (either + or −) of the first non-zero entry in168
the sequence d. Likewise, let F (d) denote the sign of the last non-zero entry169
in d. We refer to I(d) and F (d) as the initial and final signs of the gain170
sequence d. We also denote by S(d) the number of sign changes between171
consecutive entries in d after zero entries have been eliminated. Obviously,172
0 ≤ S(d) ≤ n.173
As we have assumed d = 0, there exists a neighborhood of x∗ = 0 such174
that the sign of g(x) is either + or − for all x = 0 in this neighborhood. We175
define the initial sign I(g) of g(x) as the sign of g(x) in such neighborhood,176
and define the final sign F (g) in an analogous way. Note that I(g) coincides177
with the sign of g(0) if g(0) = 0 holds. Similarly, if g(1) = 0 holds, then178
F (g) coincides with the sign of g(1). The number of sign changes S(g) of179
the function g(x) in the interval (0, 1) is the number of times it crosses the180
x-axis in (0, 1).181
The notation Δd = (Δd0, . . . ,Δdn−1), where Δdk ≡ dk+1 − dk, denotes182
the (first) forward difference of the sequence d. The second forward difference183
of the sequence d is Δ2d = (Δ2d0, . . . ,Δ
2dn−2), where Δ2dk ≡ Δdk+1−Δdk.184
These forward differences can be viewed as the counterparts to the first and185
second derivatives of a real function and are a useful tool for describing the186
shape of a sequence. In particular, the sequence d is increasing (resp. de-187
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creasing) if Δd ≥ 0 (Δd ≤ 0) holds, convex (resp. concave) if Δ2d ≥ 0188
(resp. Δ2d ≤ 0) holds, and unimodal (resp. anti-unimodal) if the sequence189
Δd has a single sign change from positive to negative (resp. from negative190
to positive). Corresponding definitions apply to the gain function g(x). For191
instance, a gain function is unimodal if its first derivative g′(x) has one sign192
change from positive to negative and is concave if its second derivative sat-193
isfies g′′(x) ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.194
3.2. Stability of trivial rest points195
One important property of the Bernstein operator Bn is that it preserves196
end-points, i.e. g(0) = Bn(0;d) = d0 and g(1) = Bn(1;d) = dn (Farouki,197
2012). From this, it is immediate that the initial and final signs of g(x) and198
d coincide in the case when d0 = 0 and dn = 0. We show in Appendix A199
that the same conclusion obtains in general, so that we have the following200
property.201
Property 1 (Preservation of initial and final signs). The initial and fi-
nal signs of g(x) and d coincide. That is,
I(g) = I(d) and F (g) = F (d).
The initial sign of g(x) describes the direction of selection in a vicinity of202
the trivial rest point x = 0, so that the rest point x = 0 is stable if and only203
if the initial sign of g(x) is negative. Similarly, the rest point x = 1 is stable204
if and only if the final sign of g(x) is positive. Hence, Property 1 implies that205
the initial and final signs of the gain sequence are all the information required206
to determine the stability of the trivial rest points. This is explicitly stated in207
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the following result, which has previously been noted by Broom et al. (1997,208
Section 4.1).209
Result 1 (Stability of trivial rest points).210
1. The rest point x = 0 is stable if and only if I(d) = −.211
2. The rest point x = 1 is stable if and only if F (d) = +.212
The first part of Result 1 asserts that strategy A is disadvantageous when213
rare if and only if the first non-zero element in the gain sequence is negative.214
The second part is the assertion that strategy A is advantageous when com-215
mon if and only if the last non-zero element in the gain sequence is positive.216
3.3. Number of (stable) interior rest points217
Let R(g) ≥ 0 denote the number of roots of g(x) in the interval (0, 1),218
counting roots according to their multiplicity. The following is the variation219
diminishing property of Bernstein polynomials.220
Property 2 (Variation diminishing property).221
1. The number of roots of g(x) on (0, 1) is equal to the number of sign222
changes of d or less by an even amount. That is,223
R(g) = S(d)− 2i, where i ≥ 0 is an integer. (3)
2. The number of sign changes of g(x) is equal to the number of sign224
changes of d or less by an even amount. That is,225
S(g) = S(d)− 2j, where j ≥ i is an integer. (4)
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The first part of the variation-diminishing property (see e.g. Farouki226
(2012)) follows from Descartes’ rule of signs, which hence can be said to227
“carry over” to polynomials in Bernstein form. The second part follows from228
the first upon observing that x ∈ (0, 1) is the location of a sign change of229
g(x) if and only if x is a root of g(x) with odd multiplicity, so that S(g) is230
either equal to R(g) or less by an even amount.231
As the interior rest points of the replicator dynamics coincide with the232
roots of g(x), Property 2.1 applies as stated to the interior rest points of233
the replicator dynamics. In particular, as noted by Cuesta et al. (2007)234
and Gokhale and Traulsen (2010), the number of sign changes of the gain235
sequence d provides an upper bound on the number of interior rest points.236
If the number of sign changes of d is odd, (3) implies that R(g) is odd.237
Consequently, the replicator dynamics possesses at least one interior rest238
point in this case.239
Stability of an interior rest point is equivalent to the requirement that240
the sign of g(x) changes from + to − at the rest point. As sign changes must241
alternate and initial signs are preserved (Property 1), the second part of the242
variation diminishing property yields the following result.243
Result 2 (Number of stable interior rest points). Let  denote the num-244
ber of stable interior rest points of the replicator dynamics and let j ≥ 0 be245
the integer appearing in the statement of Property 2.2.246
1. If S(d) is even, then  = S(g)/2 = S(d)/2− j.247
2. If S(d) is odd and I(d) = −, then  = (S(g)−1)/2 = (S(d)−1)/2− j.248
3. If S(d) is odd and I(d) = +, then 1 ≤  = (S(g) + 1)/2 = (S(d) +249
1)/2− j.250
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In the generic case in which g(x) has no multiple roots, the argument251
yielding Result 2 reduces to the one given by Broom et al. (1997, p. 939).252
3.4. Special cases253
It will be convenient to summarize the relationship between the sign pat-254
terns of the gain sequence and the rest points of the replicator dynamics255
for the cases in which the gain sequence has at most two sign changes. We256
also provide simple sufficient conditions ensuring that a gain sequence has at257
most one, resp. two sign changes.258
3.4.1. Gain sequences with one or no sign change259
When the gain sequence has no or one sign change, the variation diminish-260
ing property implies that the number of roots and the number of sign changes261
of the gain function both coincide with the number of sign changes of the262
gain sequence. In particular, Result 2 holds with j = 0. Combining these263
observations with Result 1 then shows that for games with gain sequences264
having at most one sign change, the sign pattern of the gain sequence con-265
tains all the information required to determine the number and stability of266
rest points. For later reference we state the ensuing case distinction in the267
following result.268
Result 3 (Gain sequences with no or one sign change).269
1. If the gain sequence has no sign changes, then the replicator dynamics270
has no interior rest points. Moreover271
(a) If I(d) = −, then x = 0 is stable and x = 1 is unstable.272
(b) If I(d) = +, then x = 0 is unstable and x = 1 is stable.273
14
2. If the gain sequence has a single sign change, then the replicator dy-274
namics has a unique interior rest point x∗. Moreover:275
(a) If I(d) = −, then x = 0 and x = 1 are stable, and x∗ is unstable.276
(b) If I(d) = +, then x = 0 and x = 1 are unstable, and x∗ is stable.277
The four possible dynamical regimes appearing in Result 3 correspond278
to the cases that are familiar from the evolutionary analysis of symmetric279
two-player games with two pure strategies (see, e.g. Cressman, 2003, Section280
2.2). This is, of course, not a coincidence: such two-player games are nothing281
but the special case of our model with n = 1 and thus feature gain sequences282
with at most one sign change.283
A simple sufficient condition for the applicability of Result 3 is that the284
gain sequence is monotonic, that is, either increasing or decreasing. It is285
clear that an increasing gain sequence can have at most one sign change and286
that such a sign change occurs if and only if d0 < 0 < dn. In this case, the287
rest points of the replicator dynamics are characterized by Result 3.2.a. The288
other two possibilities for an increasing gain sequence, namely dn ≤ 0 and289
d0 ≥ 0, are covered by Result 3.1.a and Result 3.1.b, respectively. Similarly,290
for a decreasing gain sequence only three of the four scenarios described in291
Result 3 are possible, with a stable interior rest point occurring if and only292
if d0 > 0 > dn.293
3.4.2. Gain sequences with two sign changes294
If the gain sequence has two sign changes, its initial and final signs coin-295
cide. Suppose they are both negative. Then, by the preservation of initial296
and final signs (Property 1), the same is true for the initial and final signs of297
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g(x). In particular, as indicated by Result 1, the rest point x = 0 is stable298
and the rest point x = 1 is unstable. Further, the first part of the variation299
diminishing property implies that the replicator dynamics has either (i) two300
distinct interior rest points (which correspond to simple roots in which g(x)301
crosses zero), (ii) one interior rest point (corresponding to a double root in302
which g(x) touches, but does not cross zero), or (iii) no interior rest point.303
In the first of these cases g(x) has two sign changes and the larger of the two304
interior rest points is stable. In the other two cases g(x) has no sign change305
and, consequently, no stable interior rest point. Considering the maximal306
value of g(x) on [0, 1], which we denote by g¯, provides a convenient way to307
describe which of these three cases arises. In particular, for g¯ < 0 there308
is no interior rest point, for g¯ = 0 there is exactly one interior rest point,309
and for g¯ > 0 there are two interior rest points. Analogous reasoning can310
be applied for the case in which the initial and final signs are both positive.311
These considerations are summarized in the following result.312
Result 4 (Gain sequences with two sign changes). Let g¯ = max0≤x≤1 g(x)313
and g = min0≤x≤1 g(x). Then:314
1. If S(d) = 2 and I(d) = − the rest point x = 0 is stable and the rest315
point x = 1 is unstable. Further:316
(a) if g¯ < 0, the replicator dynamics has no interior rest points.317
(b) if g¯ = 0, then the replicator dynamics has one interior rest point318
xˆ which is unstable.319
(c) if g¯ > 0, the replicator dynamics has one unstable rest point xL320
and one stable rest point xR, satisfying 0 < xL < xR < 1.321
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2. If S(d) = 2 and I(d) = + the rest point x = 0 is unstable and the rest322
point x = 1 is stable. Further:323
(a) If g > 0, the replicator dynamics has no interior rest points.324
(b) If g = 0, the replicator dynamics has one interior rest point xˆ325
which is unstable.326
(c) If g < 0, the replicator dynamics has one stable rest point xL and327
one unstable rest point xR, satisfying 0 < xL < xR < 1.328
It is evident from the case distinctions appearing in Result 4 that for gain329
sequences with two sign changes, information beyond the one contained in330
the sign pattern of the gain sequence is required to determine the number331
of interior rest points. However, the additional information required takes a332
simple form (namely, the knowledge of the maximal, resp. minimal value of333
the gain function), which is amenable to further analysis.334
Remark 2. If a gain sequence has more than two sign changes, Results 1335
and 2 still provide useful information about the possible range of dynamical336
scenarios, but determining which of these scenarios arises becomes much337
harder than in the case of at most two sign changes. To illustrate this,338
consider the case S(d) = 3 and suppose I(d) = +. We then have F (d) = −,339
implying that both trivial rest points are unstable (Result 1). Furthermore,340
there are either one or two stable interior rest points (Result 2). In the second341
of these cases there must exist a single unstable interior rest point, in the first342
case there is either no unstable interior rest point or one unstable interior343
rest point which corresponds to a root of the gain function with multiplicity344
two (Property 2.1).345
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3.4.3. Unimodal gain sequences346
Unimodality or anti-unimodality is a simple sufficient condition ensuring347
that a gain sequence has at most two sign changes. Furthermore, a complete348
classification of the possible dynamic scenarios is easily obtained. Here we349
demonstrate these claims for the unimodal case; the argument (and result)350
for the anti-unimodal case is analogous.351
Our argument relies on the identity352
g′(x) = nBn−1(x; Δd), (5)
which is a classical result in approximation theory, known as the derivative353
property of polynomials in Bernstein form (see e.g. Lorentz, 1986; DeVore and354
Lorentz, 1993; Farouki, 2012). By (5) the derivative g′(x) is proportional to355
a Bernstein polynomial with coefficients Δd. We may thus apply Properties356
1 and 2 to the relationship between the sign pattern of Δd and the roots and357
sign pattern of g′(x). Recalling that for a unimodal gain sequence Δd has358
a single sign change from positive to negative, it follows that unimodality359
of the gain sequence implies unimodality of the gain function. Moreover,360
applying the first part of the variation diminishing property, there exists a361
unique 0 < xˆ < 1 satisfying the first order condition g′(xˆ) = 0. Unimodality362
of g(x) implies that xˆ is the unique solution to the problem max0≤x≤1 g(x)363
appearing in the statement of Result 4. In particular, we have g¯ = g(xˆ).364
It is clear that a unimodal gain function can have at most one sign change365
in its increasing part (which then must be from negative to positive) and at366
most one sign change in its decreasing part (which then must be from positive367
to negative). Moreover, a sign change in the increasing part occurs if and368
only if g(0) < 0 < g(xˆ) and a sign change in the decreasing part occurs if and369
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only if g(1) < 0 < g(xˆ). Combining these observations yields the following370
result, refining Results 3 and 4 for the unimodal case.371
Result 5 (Unimodal gain sequences). If the gain sequence is unimodal,372
there exists a unique 0 < xˆ < 1 solving the equation g′(xˆ) = 0. Moreover:373
1. If g(xˆ) < 0, then the replicator dynamics has no interior rest point.374
The rest point x = 0 is stable and the rest point x = 1 is unstable.375
2. If g(xˆ) = 0, then xˆ is the unique interior rest point of the replicator376
dynamics. The rest point x = 0 is stable and the rest points xˆ and377
x = 1 are unstable.378
3. If g(xˆ) > 0 holds, then one of the following four cases applies:379
(a) If min{d0, dn} ≥ 0, then the replicator dynamics has no interior380
rest point. The rest point x = 0 is unstable and the rest point381
x = 1 is stable.382
(b) If max{d0, dn} < 0, then the replicator dynamics has two interior383
rest points satisfying xL < xˆ < xR. The rest points x = 0 and xR384
are stable, whereas the rest points xL and x = 1 are unstable.385
(c) If d0 < 0 and dn ≥ 0, then the replicator dynamics has a unique386
interior rest point x∗ < xˆ. The rest points x = 0 and x = 1 are387
stable, whereas the rest point x∗ is unstable.388
(d) If d0 ≥ 0 and dn < 0, then the replicator dynamics has a unique389
interior rest point x∗ > xˆ. The rest point x∗ is stable, whereas the390
rest points x = 0 and x = 1 are unstable.391
Remark 3. Using the derivative property of polynomials in Bernstein form,392
it can be shown that all the properties of gain sequences mentioned at the393
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end of Section 3.1 are inherited by the gain function (e.g., if the gain sequence394
is increasing, so is the gain function). The argument for the preservation of395
anti-unimodality is analogous to the one we have given for the preservation of396
unimodality. The other results are well known properties of Bernstein poly-397
nomials, namely preservation of monotonicity, and preservation of convexity398
(see Lorentz, 1986; Farouki, 2012). Seemingly unaware of these properties,399
Motro (1991) proves preservation of monotonicity and Bach et al. (2006)400
prove preservation of concavity (which is equivalent to preservation of con-401
vexity).402
4. Public goods games403
In this section, we apply Results 3 to 5 to two classes of public goods404
games, subsuming many of the models encountered in the literature of the405
evolution of cooperation and collective action.406
4.1. Gain sequences for public goods games407
In a public goods game, playing A means to cooperate (i.e. to contribute to408
the creation or maintenance of a public good) and playing B means to defect409
(i.e. to free ride on the contributions of others). Contributing entails a cost410
ck ≥ 0 to the focal cooperator, where k is the number of other cooperators.411
Defectors bear no cost. All players obtain a benefit rj ≥ 0 from the public412
good, where j is the total number of cooperators in the group. Note that413
for a focal cooperator j = k + 1, while for a focal defector j = k. With414
these assumptions, the payoff sequences for a public goods game can thus be415
written as416
ak = rk+1 − ck, k = 0, 1, . . . , n
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and417
bk = rk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n
so that the gain sequence is given by418
dk = Δrk − ck, k = 0, 1, . . . , n. (6)
As it is generally considered in the literature, we assume the benefit se-419
quence r = (r0, . . . , rn+1) is increasing and the cost sequence c = (c0, . . . , cn)420
is not equal to zero.421
If no further assumptions are imposed on the cost and benefit sequence, it422
is clear from (6) that any d can arise as the gain sequence of a public goods423
game. Consequently, to obtain insights into the evolutionary dynamics of424
public goods games going beyond the ones summarized in Results 1 and 2,425
additional assumptions on the benefit or the cost sequence are required. In426
this light, it is not surprising that public goods games usually studied in the427
biological literature fall into one of the two classes that we discuss in the428
following subsections.429
4.2. Threshold games430
If there exists an integer m with 1 ≤ m ≤ n + 1 and a constant r > 0431
such that the benefit sequence satisfies rj = 0 if j < m and rj = r if j ≥ m,432
we say that a public goods game is a threshold game. This class of games433
describes situations in which the public good is a “step good” in the sense434
of Hardin (1982, p. 55): at least m cooperators are required to provide a435
public good for all group members, but the number of cooperators beyond the436
threshold m does not increase the benefit received by the players. Examples437
of such threshold games abound in the theoretical literature of the social438
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sciences (Hardin, 1982; Taylor and Ward, 1982; Diekmann, 1985; Sugden,439
1986; Weesie and Franzen, 1998; Ho¨ffler, 1999; Herold, 2012) and evolutionary440
biology (Dugatkin, 1990; Bach et al., 2006; Zheng et al., 2007; Archetti, 2009;441
Souza et al., 2009), and are sometimes referred to as volunteer’s dilemmas or442
multi-player snowdrift games.443
For threshold games (6) reduces to444
dk =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
−ck if k < m− 1
r − cm−1 if k = m− 1
−ck if k > m− 1
. (7)
It is obvious that the gain sequence d has no sign change when r ≤ cm−1 and445
that in this case defection is a dominant strategy. As illustrated in Fig. 1446
and discussed below, in the other cases the sign pattern of the gain sequence447
depends on the location of the threshold m.448
[Figure 1 about here.]449
4.2.1. Threshold m = 1450
Threshold games with m = 1 represent situations in which only one co-451
operator is required for the provision of the public good. Such games have452
been considered by Dugatkin (1990), Weesie and Franzen (1998), Zheng et al.453
(2007), and Souza et al. (2009) for the particular case of a cost sequence satis-454
fying ck = c/(k+ 1) for some constant c > 0, so that the cost to cooperators455
is inversely proportional to the total number of cooperators in the group.456
These authors have shown by algebraic manipulations or numerical simula-457
tions that for such games the replicator dynamics has at most one interior458
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stable rest point. Archetti (2009) shows the same result for a cost sequence459
satisfying ck = c for some constant c > 0.460
Considering the sign pattern of the gains from switching not only recovers461
this result in a simpler way, but also extends it to any strictly positive cost462
sequence c. If r > c0, the gain sequence given in (7) has exactly one sign463
change and I(d) = +, so that Result 3.2.b establishes the existence of a464
single interior stable rest point 0 < x∗ < 1 and the instability of the trivial465
rest points (see Fig. 1.a). If r ≤ c0, Result 3.1.a applies. Hence, there is no466
interior rest point and x = 0 is the unique stable rest point.467
4.2.2. Threshold m = n+ 1468
Recalling that N = n+ 1 is group size, threshold games with m = n + 1469
represent situations in which the cooperation of all group members is required470
to produce the public good. For the case m = n+1 = 2 and a cost sequence471
satisfying 0 < c0 = c1 < r, Souza et al. (2009) observe that such a threshold472
game corresponds to a two-player stag hunt game (Skyrms, 2004) in which473
both trivial rest points are stable and there is a unique, unstable interior474
rest point. It is easy to see that this result holds more generally. Indeed,475
provided that the cost sequence is strictly positive and satisfies r > cn, the476
gain sequence given in (7) is characterized by S(d) = 1 and I(d) = −. Then,477
by Result 3.2.a, it follows that the qualitative dynamics of the two-player stag478
hunt are recovered for every threshold game with m = n + 1 (see Fig. 1.b).479
The case r ≤ cn is covered by Result 3.1.a.480
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4.2.3. Threshold 1 < m < n+ 1481
Souza et al. (2009) studied a threshold game with 1 < m < n + 1 for a482
cost sequence of the form483
ck =
⎧⎨
⎩
c/m if k < m− 1
c/(k + 1) if k ≥ m− 1
(8)
for some constant c > 0. Their main theoretical result (Souza et al., 2009,484
Theorem 1) uses an ingenious but rather involved argument to demonstrate485
that in this example there exists c¯ > 0 and 0 < x¯ < 1 such that (i) if c < c¯,486
the replicator dynamics has two interior rest points xL < x¯ < xR where xL is487
unstable and xR is stable (see Fig. 1.c), (ii) if c = c¯, the replicator dynamics488
has a unique rest point x¯ (which is unstable), and (iii) if c > c¯, the replicator489
dynamics has no interior rest point (see Fig. 1.d).2490
In Appendix B we prove that the same result holds for any cost sequence491
of the form ck = c · γk, where the strictly positive, but otherwise arbitrary,492
sequence γ describes the shape of the cost sequence and, as in the example493
considered by Souza et al. (2009), c shifts the level of the cost sequence.494
Our result follows, in essence, from two observations. The first is that for495
every threshold game with 1 < m < n+1 and strictly positive cost sequence496
satisfying 0 < cm−1 < r the gain sequence has two sign changes and a negative497
initial sign, so that the rest points of the replicator dynamics are described498
by Result 4.1. The second observation is that the maximal value of the gain499
function g¯ is strictly decreasing in the cost parameter c.500
2Souza et al. (2009) express their results in terms of the cost-benefit ratio c/r. The
difference is of no importance as time can always be rescaled to ensure r = 1.
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Threshold games with 1 < m < n+ 1 have also been considered by Bach501
et al. (2006), Archetti (2009), and Archetti and Scheuring (2011). These502
authors assume a cost sequence satisfying ck = c for some constant c >503
0, implying that these games fall in the class of constant cost games with504
sigmoid benefit functions that we discuss in Section 4.3.3.505
4.2.4. Further threshold games506
In economics, Ho¨ffler (1999) and Herold (2012) have studied evolutionary507
dynamics of threshold games which differ from the biological threshold games508
considered above in that cooperators pay a cost only if the threshold for the509
successful provision of the public good is reached. In such cases the gain510
sequence has the form511
dk =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if k < m− 1
r − cm−1 if k = m− 1
−ck if k > m− 1
(9)
and thus possesses at most one sign change (see Fig. 2). For r > cm−1 and512
1 ≤ m < n+1, this gain sequence satisfies I(d) = + and S(d) = 1. Applying513
Result 3.2.b then yields a simple direct proof of the main result obtained by514
Ho¨ffler (1999, Proposition 1) and Herold (2012, Proposition 1) for this class515
of games, namely that there exists a unique stable interior rest point.3516
[Figure 2 about here.]517
3Proposition 2 in Ho¨ffler (1999), which considers the case m = n+1, is implied by our
Result 3.1.b. Herold also considers the case in which cooperators only pay a cost if the
threshold is not reached. His main result for this case (Herold, 2012, Proposition 2) is
implied by our Result 3.2.a.
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4.3. Constant cost games518
If there exists a constant c > 0 such that ck = c holds for k = 0, . . . , n519
we say that a public goods game is a constant cost game. Such games have520
been studied, among others, by Motro (1991), Szathma´ry (1993), Bach et al.521
(2006), Hauert et al. (2006), Pacheco et al. (2009), and Archetti and Scheur-522
ing (2011).523
In the case of a constant cost game, equation (6) reduces to524
dk = Δrk − c, k = 0, 1, . . . , n. (10)
It is then immediate that the gain sequence has no sign change (and hence525
no interior rest point) if c ≥ maxk=0,...,nΔrk or mink=0,...,nΔrk ≥ c holds. It526
follows from Result 3.1 that in the former case x = 0 and in the latter case527
x = 1 is the unique stable rest point. In all other cases, that is whenever the528
inequality529
min
k=0,...,n
Δrk < c < max
k=0,...,n
Δrk (11)
holds, the gain sequence has at least one sign change.530
In the following, we consider three different kinds of constant cost games,531
arising from three different assumptions on the shape of the benefit sequence:532
linear benefits (Section 4.3.1), convex or concave benefits (Section 4.3.2) and533
sigmoid benefits (Section 4.3.3). See Fig. 3 for a graphical illustration of534
these different constant cost games.535
[Figure 3 about here.]536
4.3.1. Linear benefits537
The familiar linear public goods game is a constant cost game in which538
the benefit sequence is given by rj = jr/(n + 1) (Sigmund, 2010). The539
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interpretation is that r > 0 is the amount of the public good produced by540
each cooperator and that this amount is split evenly among the N = n + 1541
members of the group. For such a game, we have Δrk = r/(n + 1), so that542
the gain sequence is dk = r/(n+1)− c, which is a constant independent of k.543
Hence d has no sign change. Making the standard assumption r < (n+ 1)c,544
we have I(d) = −, so that there are no interior rest points and x = 0 is545
the unique stable rest point (see Fig. 3.a). This conclusion is, of course,546
well-known.547
4.3.2. Convex or concave benefits548
Convexity of the benefit sequence (Δ2r ≥ 0) indicates that the incremen-549
tal benefit Δrk of a further contributor is increasing in the number of other550
contributors k that are already present in the group. Using (10) to obtain551
Δdk = Δ
2rk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, (12)
it is apparent that the gain sequence d is increasing. As discussed in Sec-552
tion 3.4.1 it follows that (11) reduces to Δr0 < c < Δrn. Furthermore, if553
these inequalities hold, Result 3.2.a implies that there is a unique interior554
rest point which is unstable, whereas both trivial rest points are stable (see555
Fig. 3.b). Similarly, when the benefit sequence is concave (Δ2r ≤ 0), (11)556
reduces to Δrn < c < Δr0 and if these inequalities hold, Result 3.2.b implies557
there is a unique interior rest point which is stable, whereas both trivial rest558
points are unstable (see Fig. 3.c).559
The argument we have just given recovers the main results from Motro560
(1991). A simple illustration of a constant cost game with convex or constant561
benefits is provided by the model of synergy and discounting considered in562
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Hauert et al. (2006, Section 2.1). These authors consider a constant cost563
game with benefit function564
rj =
r
n + 1
(
1 + w + . . . wj−1
)
, (13)
where r > 0 and w > 0 are parameters. For this specification we have565
Δrk = rw
k/(n + 1). For w > 1 this benefit sequence is convex, whereas for566
w < 1 it is concave. The case w = 1 is the linear public goods game. We567
observe that the classification obtained in Section 2.2 of Hauert et al. (2006),568
corresponds to the one obtained from a straightforward application of our569
Result 3.570
4.3.3. Sigmoid benefits571
A benefit sequence is sigmoid (or S-shaped) when Δ2r has exactly one sign572
change from + to −, i.e. the benefit sequence is first convex, then concave.573
Examples of sigmoid benefit sequences are the threshold benefit sequences574
with 1 < m < n+ 1 considered in Section 4.2.3, the “benefit function with a575
hump” proposed in Szathma´ry (1993), and the threshold-linear and logistic576
benefit sequences studied respectively by Pacheco et al. (2009) and Archetti577
and Scheuring (2011).578
In this case it is immediate from (12) that the gain sequence of a constant579
cost game with sigmoid benefits is unimodal. Consequently, the characteri-580
zation of the different types of dynamics that can arise in such games involves581
nothing more than inserting the values dk = Δrk − c into our Result 5 (see582
Fig. 3.d for a particular example). The results of this exercise have been583
published by Archetti (2013).4584
4Archetti (2013) ignores most of the cases in which a weak inequality occurs in Result 5
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Sigmoid benefit sequences generalize the benefit sequences considered in585
Bach et al. (2006, Proposition 7), who not only assume that Δ2r has a single586
sign change from + to −, but, in addition, require Δ2r to be decreasing.587
Using these assumptions, Bach et al. (2006) establish the existence of a588
c∗ > max{Δr0,Δrn} such that for c < c∗ the replicator dynamics has two589
interior rest points (the larger of which is stable), whereas for c = c∗ there590
is a unique (unstable) interior rest point and for c > c∗ there is none. As591
the gain sequence (and hence the gain function and g¯) for constant cost592
games is linearly decreasing in c, it is immediate from Result 5 that the same593
conclusion obtains for all sigmoid benefit sequences.594
5. Other multi-player games595
Up to this point our examples have considered public goods games. Here596
we consider two examples of other multi-player games, illustrating how fo-597
cusing on the shape of the gain sequence obviates the need for a more in-598
volved analysis. Of course, further examples could be analyzed along similar599
lines. For instance, it is straightforward to show that in the “shared reward600
dilemma” considered by Cuesta et al. (2008) the gain sequence has at most601
two sign changes, so that we can recover their case distinctions by applying602
our results.603
and neglects to impose the proper sign change condition required for unimodality, but these
shortcomings are easily fixed.
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5.1. Repeated N-person prisoner’s dilemma604
Joshi (1987), Boyd and Richerson (1988) and van Segbroeck et al. (2012)605
considered a repeated N -person prisoner’s dilemma with two possible strate-606
gies. Reciprocators (A-strategists) contribute to the public good in the first607
round and then contribute in each subsequent round if at least m individuals608
(including the focal individual) contributed in the previous move. Defectors609
(B-strategists) never contribute to the public good. Payoffs in each round610
depend on the number of contributors as in the linear public goods game611
considered in Section 4.3.1.612
The gain sequence for this model is easily derived by considering the first613
round and the subsequent rounds separately. In the first round, the gain if614
switching from B to A is r/(n+1)−c < 0. In each subsequent round, the gain615
from switching is zero if k < m− 1 (because all players defect), r/(n+1)− c616
if k > m − 1 (because the other reciprocators cooperate no matter whether617
the focal individual contributes or not), and mr/(n + 1) − c if k = m − 1618
(because in this case the contribution of the focal individual in the first round619
is pivotal in determining the subsequent behavior of reciprocators). Setting620
c˜ = c− r/(n+ 1) > 0,
and621
r˜ = (m− 1)r/(n+ 1),
the gain sequence can be written as622
dk =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−c˜ if k < m− 1
T r˜ − (T + 1)c˜ if k = m− 1
−(T + 1)c˜ if k > m− 1
, (14)
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where T > 0 denotes the expected number of rounds after the first one.623
From (7) and (14) it is apparent that the model is equivalent to a threshold624
game with (i) the benefit T r˜ arising if and only if at least m reciprocators625
are present and (ii) costs given by ck = c˜ if k < m − 1 and ck = (T + 1)c˜626
otherwise. In particular, the results for the cases m = 1 and m = n + 1 are627
identical to the ones discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Moreover, when628
T r˜− (T + 1)c˜ is negative, it is immediate that the gain sequence is negative629
and Result 3.1.a applies.630
In the remaining case, satisfying 1 < m < n+ 1 and T r˜ − (T + 1)c˜ > 0,631
it follows from (14) that the only non-zero elements of Δd are Δdm−2 > 0632
and Δdm−1 < 0. Consequently, the gain sequence is unimodal and Result 5633
applies with max{d0, dn} < 0 to characterize the three different possible634
dynamical regimes. Which of these regimes arises depends on the value of635
g¯ = g(xˆ) (see Fig. 4 for an example of the case g¯ > 0). As in all applications636
of Results 4 and 5, a key question is whether this value can be linked to the637
parameters of the model.638
[Figure 4 about here.]639
For the parameter T this question can be answered by using the linearity640
of the Bernstein operator Bn to write the gain function as641
g(x) = Th(x)− c˜, (15)
where h(x) = Bn(x, e) and the sequence e is given by642
ek =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if k < m− 1
r˜ − c˜ if k = m− 1
−c˜ if k > m− 1
.
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It follows from (15) that the critical value xˆ satisfying the first order condition643
g′(xˆ) = 0 is independent of T . Further, because I(e) = +, it follows from the644
preservation of initial signs that h(xˆ) > 0 holds. This in turn implies from645
(15) that g(xˆ) is strictly increasing in T and that the equation Tˆ = c˜/h(xˆ)646
identifies the critical value of T at which g(xˆ) = 0 holds. Hence, we obtain647
the same conclusions as van Segbroeck et al. (2012) by an application of648
Result 5. Namely, (i) for T < Tˆ there is no interior rest point, (ii) for T = Tˆ649
the replicator dynamics has a single, unstable interior rest point, and (iii) for650
T > Tˆ two interior rest points emerge.651
5.2. Constant cost game with different benefit sequences for cooperators and652
defectors653
[Figure 5 about here.]654
Hauert et al. (2006, Section 2.3.2) consider an interesting extension of
constant cost games by allowing for the possibility that cooperators and
defectors might obtain different benefits, say rAj and r
B
j , when there are
j cooperators in the group (see Fig. 5). The counterpart to (12) is then
Δdk = Δr
A
k+1−ΔrBk . For the particular choice of benefit sequences in Hauert
et al. (2006), given by (13) for rAj and
rBj =
r
n+ 1
(
1 + v1 + . . . vj−1
)
,
this reduces to655
Δdk =
r
n+ 1
(
wk+1 − vk) , (16)
where r > 0, v > 0 and w > 0 are parameters and N = n + 1 is group size.656
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Hauert et al. (2006) state that “only v = w allows for an analytical solu-
tion [...] but in general there are [...] up to N − 1 equilibria [rest points] in
(0, 1).” Here we refine this statement and show that, as conjectured by Cuesta
et al. (2007), the maximum number of interior rest points is two indepen-
dently of group size. To do so, we observe that Δdk > 0 holds if and only
if
w >
( v
w
)k
.
Since the right side of this inequality is monotonic in k, equation (16) implies657
the following, exhaustive case distinction:658
1. if w ≥ 1 and wn ≥ vn−1 holds, then the gain sequence is increasing and659
there is at most one interior rest point (see Fig. 5.a).660
2. if w ≤ 1 and wn ≤ vn−1 holds, then the gain sequence is decreasing661
and there is at most one interior rest point (see Fig. 5.b).662
3. if w > 1 and wn < vn−1 holds, then the gain sequence is unimodal and663
there are at most two interior rest points (see Fig. 5.c).664
4. if w < 1 and wn > vn−1 holds, then the gain sequence is anti-unimodal665
and there are at most two interior rest points (see Fig. 5.d).666
6. Discussion667
Bernstein polynomials were first proposed more than a century ago by Bern-668
stein (1912) in order to provide a constructive proof of Weierstrass’s approxi-669
mation theorem (DeVore and Lorentz, 1993). More recently, because of their670
many shape-preserving properties, polynomials in Bernstein form have also671
proven extremely useful in the field of computer aided geometric design (Ya-672
maguchi and Yamaguchi, 1988; Farin and Hoschek, 2002; Prautzsch et al.,673
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2002). Here we have made the case for utilizing the shape-preserving prop-674
erties of Bernstein polynomials in the analysis of multi-player matrix games.675
In particular, we have used these properties to show how key insights into the676
evolutionary dynamics of multi-player matrix games can be obtained from677
studying the sign pattern of the gains from switching.678
The properties of Bernstein polynomials we have used in this paper are679
certainly not the only ones of relevance for the theoretical analysis of col-680
lective action problems. For instance, both the effects of changes in the681
group size (studied previously in Motro, 1991) and the group size distribu-682
tion (studied previously in Pen˜a, 2012) on the evolutionary dynamics can be683
analyzed by making use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. Our684
methods can also be extended to structured populations and used to analyze685
multi-player matrix games played between relatives.686
Acknowledgements687
We would like to thank Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Arne Traulsen and one688
anonymous reviewer for useful comments on previous versions of the manuscript.689
This work was supported by Swiss NSF grants PBLAP3-145860 (JP) and690
PP00P3-123344 (LL).691
Appendix A. Proof of Result 1692
We show the result I(g) = I(d); the argument that the final signs coincide693
is analogous. Using the derivative property of polynomials in Bernstein form694
(cf. equation (5)) recursively, for 0 ≤ m ≤ n the m-th derivative of the gain695
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function can be written as (Farouki, 2012)696
g(m)(x) = n(n− 1) . . . (n−m+ 1)Bn−m (x; Δmd) , (A.1)
where (with the obvious iterative definition) Δmd is the m-th forward differ-697
ence of the sequence d. Evaluating (A.1) at x = 0 we obtain698
g(m)(0) = n(n− 1) . . . (n−m+ 1)Δmd0. (A.2)
Now, let  be the lowest index k such that d = 0. Then Δmd0 = 0 holds699
for all m <  and Δd0 = d. Equation (A.2) then implies that g
(m)(0) = 0700
for all m <  and that the sign of g()(0) coincides with the sign of d which,701
by definition, is the initial sign of d. A standard Taylor-series argument as702
given in Bach et al. (2006, Proof of Proposition 4) demonstrates that the703
initial sign of g coincides with the sign of d, finishing the proof.704
Appendix B. Proof of the generalization of Theorem 1 from Souza705
et al. (2009)706
For any c ≥ 0 let707
g(x, c) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−kdk(c), (B.1)
where708
dk(c) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
−cγk if k < m− 1
r − cγm−1 if k = m− 1
−cγk if k > m− 1
(B.2)
and γ = (γ0, . . . , γn) is a given, strictly positive sequence. Let g¯(c) =709
max0≤x≤1 g(x, c) denote the corresponding maximal value of the gain func-710
tion.711
35
For 0 < c < r/γm−1 the gain sequence given in (B.2) satisfies I(d(c)) = −712
and S(d(c)) = 2, so that the rest points of the replicator dynamics are713
described by Result 4.1.714
From (B.1) and (B.2) the function g(x, c) is continuous. From the max-715
imum theorem (Sundaram, 1996, Theorem 9.14) this ensures continuity of716
g¯(c). Because all the Bernstein coefficients dk(c) are strictly decreasing in c,717
all the summands appearing in (B.1) are strictly decreasing in c, implying718
that g(x, c) is strictly decreasing in c. This monotonicity property obviously719
carries over to g¯(c).720
Consider the Bernstein coefficients as given in (B.2). If c = 0, the only721
non-zero coefficient is dm−1(0) = r > 0. It is then immediate from (B.1) that722
g(x, 0) > 0 holds for all 0 < x < 1, ensuring g¯(0) > 0. If c = r/γm−1, we have723
dk(c) ≤ 0 with strict inequality holding in all cases but k = m − 1. From724
(B.1) this implies g(x, r/γm−1) < 0 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, ensuring g¯(r/γm−1) < 0.725
Because g¯(0) > 0 and g¯(r/γm−1) < 0 hold and g¯(c) is continuous the in-726
termediate value theorem implies that there exists 0 < c¯ < r/γm−1 satisfying727
g¯(c¯) = 0. By monotonicity of g¯(c) it follows that g¯(c) < 0 holds for c > c¯728
and g¯(c) > 0 holds for c < c¯. The generalized version of Theorem 1 in Souza729
et al. (2009) then follows from our Result 4.1 – except that it remains to730
establish the existence of 0 < x¯ < 1 such that the interior rest points satisfy731
xL < x¯ < xR for all 0 < c < c¯. Towards this end let x¯ be a solution to732
the problem max0≤x≤1 g(x, c¯). As g(0, c¯) < 0 and g(1, c¯) < 0 holds, we have733
0 < x¯ < 1. As g(x, c) is strictly decreasing in c, we have g(x¯, c) > 0 for all734
0 < c < c¯. In conjunction with g(0, c) < 0 and g(1, c) < 0 this implies that735
g(x, c) has at least one root in the interval (0, x¯) and at least one root in the736
36
interval (x¯, 1).737
Archetti, M., 2009. The volunteer’s dilemma and the optimal size of a social738
group. Journal of Theoretical Biology 261 (3), 475–480.739
Archetti, M., 2013. Evolutionary game theory of growth factor production:740
implications for tumour heterogeneity and resistance to therapies. British741
Journal of Cancer 109 (4), 1056–1062.742
Archetti, M., Scheuring, I., 2011. Coexistence of cooperation and defection743
in public goods games. Evolution 65 (4), 1140–1148.744
Axelrod, R., Hamilton, W. D., 1981. The evolution of cooperation. Science745
211 (4489), 1390–1396.746
Bach, L., Helvik, T., Christiansen, F., 2006. The evolution of n-player747
cooperation–threshold games and ESS bifurcations. Journal of Theoret-748
ical Biology 238 (2), 426–434.749
Bernstein, S., 1912. De´monstration du the´oreme de Weierstrass fonde´e sur750
le calcul des probabilite´s. Comm. Soc. Math. Kharkov 13 (2), 1–2.751
Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., 1988. The evolution of reciprocity in sizable752
groups. Journal of Theoretical Biology 132 (3), 337–356.753
Broom, M., Cannings, C., Vickers, G., 1997. Multi-player matrix games.754
Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 59 (5), 931–952.755
Broom, M., Rychta´rˇ, J., 2013. Game-theoretical models in biology. Chapman756
and Hall, New York, NY.757
37
Brown, L. D., Johnstone, I. M., MacGibbon, K. B., 1981. Variation diminish-758
ing transformations: A direct approach to total positivity and its statistical759
applications. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 824–832.760
Bukowski, M., Mie¸kisz, J., 2004. Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in761
symmetric multi-player games. International Journal of Game Theory762
33 (1), 41–54.763
Bulmer, M. G., Parker, G. A., 2002. The evolution of anisogamy: A game-764
theoretic approach. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series765
B-Biological Sciences 269, 2381–2388.766
Clark, A., 1984. Elements of abstract algebra. Courier Dover Publications,767
New York, NY.768
Clark, C. W., Mangel, M., 1986. The evolutionary advantages of group for-769
aging. Theoretical Population Biology 30, 45–75.770
Comins, H. N., Hamilton, W. D., May, R. M., 1980. Evolutionarily stable771
dispersal strategies. Journal of Theoretical Biology 82, 205–230.772
Cressman, R., 2003. Evolutionary dynamics and extensive form games. MIT773
Press, Cambridge, MA.774
Cuesta, J., Jime´nez, R., Lugo, H., Sa´nchez, A., 2008. The shared reward775
dilemma. Journal of Theoretical Biology 251 (2), 253–263.776
Cuesta, J. A., Jime´nez, R., Lugo, H., Sa´nchez, A., 2007. Rewarding co-777
operation in social dilemmas. UC3M Working papers. Economics 07-27,778
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economı´a.779
38
Dercole, F., Rinaldi, S., 2008. Analysis of Evolutionary Processes: The Adap-780
tive Dynamics Approach and Its Applications: The Adaptive Dynamics781
Approach and Its Applications. Princeton University Press.782
DeVore, R. A., Lorentz, G. G., 1993. Constructive Approximation. Springer-783
Verlag, Berlin, Germany.784
Dieckmann, U., Law, R., 1996. The dynamical theory of coevolution: a785
derivation from stochastic ecological processes 34 (5-6), 579–612.786
Diekmann, A., 1985. Volunteer’s dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution787
29 (4), 605–610.788
Dugatkin, L. A., 1990. N-person games and the evolution of co-operation: A789
model based on predator inspection in fish. Journal of Theoretical Biology790
142 (1), 123–135.791
Eshel, I., 1996. On the changing concept of evolutionary population stability792
as a reflection of a changing point of view in the quantitative theory of793
evolution. Journal of Mathematical Biology 34, 485–510.794
Farin, G., Hoschek, J., 2002. Handbook of computer aided geometric design.795
North Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands.796
Farouki, R. T., 2012. The Bernstein polynomial basis: A centennial retro-797
spective. Computer Aided Geometric Design 29 (6), 379–419.798
Frank, S. A., 1987. Individual and population sex allocation patterns. Theo-799
retical Population Biology 31, 47–74.800
39
Frank, S. A., 1995. Mutual policing and repression of competition in the801
evolution of cooperative units. Nature 377, 520–522.802
Gokhale, C. S., Traulsen, A., 2010. Evolutionary games in the multiverse.803
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 (12), 5500–5504.804
Hamilton, W. D., 1967. Extraordinary sex ratios. Science 156 (3774), 477–805
488.806
Hamilton, W. D., May, R. M., 1977. Dispersal in stable habitats. Nature807
269 (5629), 578–581.808
Hardin, R., 1982. Collective action. The John Hopkins Press for Resources809
for the Future, Baltimore, Maryland.810
Hauert, C., Michor, F., Nowak, M. A., Doebeli, M., 2006. Synergy and dis-811
counting of cooperation in social dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology812
239 (2), 195–202.813
Herold, F., 2012. Carrot or stick? The evolution of reciprocal preferences in814
a haystack model. The American Economic Review 102 (2), 914–940.815
Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K., 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dy-816
namics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.817
Ho¨ffler, F., 1999. Some play fair, some don’t: Reciprocal fairness in a styl-818
ized principal–agent problem. Journal of economic behavior & organization819
38 (1), 113–131.820
Joshi, N., 1987. Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured821
demes. Journal of Genetics 66 (1), 69–84.822
40
Kirkpatrick, M., Rousset, F., 2005. Wright meets AD: not all landscapes are823
adaptive. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 18 (5), 1166–1169.824
Kurokawa, S., Ihara, Y., 2009. Emergence of cooperation in public goods825
games. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276 (1660),826
1379–1384.827
Lorentz, G. G., 1986. Bernstein polynomials. Chelsea Publishing Company,828
New York, NY.829
Maynard Smith, J., 1982. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge830
University Press, Cambridge, UK.831
Maynard Smith, J., Price, G. R., 1973. The logic of animal conflict. Nature832
246 (5427), 15–18.833
Motro, U., 1991. Co-operation and defection: Playing the field and the ESS.834
Journal of Theoretical Biology 151 (2), 145–154.835
Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., Souza, M. O., Skyrms, B., 2009. Evolutionary836
dynamics of collective action in n-person stag hunt dilemmas. Proceedings837
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276 (1655), 315–321.838
Pen˜a, J., 2012. Group-size diversity in public goods games. Evolution 66 (3),839
623–636.840
Prautzsch, H., Boehm, W., Paluszny, M., 2002. Be´zier and B-spline tech-841
niques. Springer, Berlin, Germany.842
Rousset, F., 2004. Genetic Structure and Selection in Subdivided Popula-843
tions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.844
41
Sigmund, K., 2010. The calculus of selfishness. Princeton University Press,845
Princeton, NJ.846
Skyrms, B., 2004. The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure. Cam-847
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.848
Souza, M. O., Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., 2009. Evolution of cooperation849
under n-person snowdrift games. Journal of Theoretical Biology 260 (4),850
581–588.851
Sugden, R., 1986. The economics of rights, co-operation and welfare. Black-852
well, Oxford, UK.853
Sundaram, R. K., 1996. A first course in optimization theory. Cambridge854
University Press, Cambridge, UK.855
Szathma´ry, E., 1993. Co-operation and defection: Playing the field in virus856
dynamics. Journal of Theoretical Biology 165 (3), 341–356.857
Taylor, M., Ward, H., 1982. Chickens, whales, and lumpy goods: alternative858
models of public-goods provision. Political Studies 30 (3), 350–370.859
Taylor, P. D., Jonker, L. B., 1978. Evolutionary stable strategies and game860
dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences 40, 145–156.861
van Segbroeck, S., Pacheco, J. M., Lenaerts, T., Santos, F. C., 2012. Emer-862
gence of fairness in repeated group interactions. Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,863
158104.864
42
Vincent, T. L., Brown, J. S., 2005. Evolutionary game theory, natural selec-865
tion, and Darwinian dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,866
UK.867
Weesie, J., Franzen, A., 1998. Cost sharing in a volunteer’s dilemma. Journal868
of Conflict Resolution 42 (5), 600–618.869
Weibull, J. W., 1995. Evolutionary game theory. The MIT press, Cambridge,870
MA.871
Yamaguchi, F., Yamaguchi, F., 1988. Curves and surfaces in computer aided872
geometric design. Springer-Verlag Berlin, Berlin, Germany.873
Zheng, D. F., Yin, H. P., Chan, C. H., Hui, P. M., 2007. Cooperative behavior874
in a model of evolutionary snowdrift games with n-person interactions.875
EPL (Europhysics Letters) 80 (1), 18002.876
43
00 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 x* 1
 a
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 x* 1
 b
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 xL xR 1
 c
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 1
 d
Figure 1: Gain sequence d (squares, dotted line; top axis), and corresponding gain function
g(x) (solid line; bottom axis) and phase portrait (circles, arrows) for threshold games
given by (7) and (8) with N = 7, r = 2, c = 1, and (a) m = 1 (see section 4.2.1), (b)
m = N = n+1 (see section 4.2.2), or (c) m = 4 (see section 4.2.3). Panel d illustrates the
same game as in panel c, but with c = 3 instead of c = 1.
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Figure 2: Gain sequence d (squares, dotted line; top axis), and corresponding gain function
g(x) (solid line; bottom axis) and phase portrait (circles, arrows) for the threshold game
given by (9) with N = 10, r = 2, m = 4, and ck = 1/4 for all k ≥ 3.
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Figure 3: Examples of constant cost games with N = n+ 1 = 9 and c = 1/2 for different
benefit sequences. The first row shows the benefit sequence rj ; the second row shows the
gain sequence d (squares, dotted line; top axis), and corresponding gain function g(x)
(solid line; bottom axis) and phase portrait (circles, arrows). (a) Linear benefits (see
Section 4.3.1) with r = 5 and c = 1. (b) Convex benefits (see Section 4.3.2) as given
by (13) with r = 5 and w = 1.2. (c) Concave benefits (see Section 4.3.2) as given by (13)
with r = 20 and w = 0.8. (d) Sigmoid benefits (see Section 4.3.3) as studied by Archetti
and Scheuring (2011) with rj = r/[1 + exp(−s(j −m))], r = 20, m = 4, and s = 1.5.
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Figure 4: Gain sequence d (squares, dotted line; top axis), and corresponding gain function
g(x) (solid line; bottom axis) and phase portrait (circles, arrows) for the repeatedN -person
prisoner’s dilemma given by (14) with N = 10, r = 7, c = 2, T = 5, and m = 6.
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Figure 5: Gain sequence d (squares, dotted line; top axis), and corresponding gain function
g(x) (solid line; bottom axis) and phase portrait (circles, arrows) of the game considered
in Section 5.2 for N = 7 and different values of the parameters w, v, r and c. (a) w = 1.3,
v = 1.2, r = 1, c = 3. (b) w = 0.6, v = 0.57, r = 2, c = 1. (c) w = 1.3, v = 1.4, r = 2,
c = 3.4. (d) w = 0.75, v = 0.6, r = 1.55, c = 1.25.
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